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SCHOLAR, INNOVATOR, AND 
MENTOR 
RACHEL REBOUCHÉ, J.D., LL.M. 
I met Professor Karen Rothenberg in 2011 when we were both visiting 
faculty members at the Berman Institute of Bioethics at Johns Hopkins 
University. I was in my second year of full-time law teaching, and Karen was an 
academic whose work I deeply admired. Karen’s scholarship on prenatal testing 
and the gender implications of clinical research (to name just two contributions) 
had transformed the field of health law.1   
I was impressed with Karen’s immediate and generous mentorship. Within 
a week of meeting at the Berman Institute, we were discussing the trajectory of 
prenatal genetic screening and testing. At faculty meetings, I learned that, in 
addition to being a well-known and respected scholar, Karen also was an avid 
student of the most cutting-edge issues in genetics and the law. After one faculty 
gathering, she approached me to talk about a new technology: non-invasive 
prenatal genetic testing (NIPT).  
NIPT is administered early in pregnancy and screens the fetus for certain 
genetic characteristics.  In 2011, NIPT had recently entered clinical practice.2  
Pregnant women traditionally relied on blood tests and ultrasounds to screen 
fetuses for genetic or physical anomalies. Depending on the level of risk, patients 
might elect a second trimester screen, followed by testing fetal cells collected 
through amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling.3 NIPT, however, collects 
cell-free fetal DNA from a sample of the pregnant woman’s blood.4  The test is 
99% accurate at only nine or ten weeks of gestation with research demonstrating 
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high levels of accuracy as early as six or seven weeks of pregnancy.5  At present, 
NIPT can identify aneuploidies (an abnormal number chromosomes in a cell) 
and detect fetal sex; however, NIPT, with advances in gene sequencing, promises 
to reveal more prenatal information in the not-too-distant future.6   
Around the time that Karen and I were discussing NIPT, Karen was invited 
to contribute an article to a symposium issue on health care law for the Howard 
Law Journal. She wanted to write about the intersection of NIPT and abortion 
restrictions.  Knowing of my interest in both topics, Karen asked if I would be 
willing to co-author a piece with her. 
Most junior faculty members, asked by a leader in their discipline to co-
author an article, might expect to do most of the work and receive half the credit. 
But that is not Karen’s approach.  We met to talk through ideas, exchanged 
numerous drafts, and worked as a team. Karen values building relationships with 
other scholars, and she sets a high standard in her research and writing while 
providing invaluable support as a collaborator.  
I learned a great deal about prenatal genetic testing in the course of co-
authoring our law review article, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal 
Genetic Testing and Abortion.  We argued that current law and practice put 
genetic testing and abortion on a collision course; what pregnant women could 
learn about their pregnancies was expanding while, at the same time, post-testing 
options were contracting.7  We predicted that the termination of pregnancies for 
reason of fetal anomaly would become a focal point of public policy debates and 
court decisions.8   
Since we wrote Mixed Messages, state legislatures have passed laws 
banning abortion on the ground of fetal anomalies (as well as on the grounds of 
fetal sex and race).  Most of these statutes have been struck down by federal 
courts. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
enjoined a law that banned abortion “solely because the fetus has been diagnosed 
with, or has a potential diagnosis of, Down syndrome or any other disability.”9 
The court noted that an impetus for the Indiana law was NIPT:  
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The State presents evidence that these provisions were passed in light of 
technological developments that allow the diagnosis or potential diagnosis of 
fetal disabilities to be made early in a pregnancy. In particular, cell-free fetal 
DNA testing is able to screen for several genetic abnormalities, including Down 
syndrome, as early as ten weeks into pregnancy.10  
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
state’s argument that genetic screening will result in discrimination against 
fetuses with disabilities and held that the provision was an unconstitutional 
restriction on a woman’s right to pre-viability abortion.11 A similar law passed 
in North Dakota, prohibiting abortion because of “any physical disfigurement, 
scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, albinism, or any other type of physical or 
mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”12 That law was enjoined by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also on the ground that it 
unconstitutionally restricted the right to pre-viability abortion.13  
These court battles highlight a point Karen has made so eloquently 
throughout her scholarship on the larger dilemmas presented by prenatal testing. 
Too often, in the midst of litigating constitutional rights in the face of anti-
abortion legislation, the lived realities of pregnant women are obscured.  After 
prenatal testing, pregnant women must make difficult decisions about 
terminating wanted pregnancies. They face pressures to test but with increasingly 
limited options of how to act upon resulting information. Karen was one of the 
first scholars to understand what those pressures mean for the quality of prenatal 
care women receive as well as the consequences for persons (and their families) 
with disabilities. 
I am delighted to be a part of this fitting and well-deserved tribute to 
Karen’s generosity of spirit and broad-reaching intellect.  When we finished our 
Mixed Messages article, Karen encouraged me to present it to the Berman 
Institute faculty and at a conference hosted by Case Western Reserve University 
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School of Law. And I have since authored a series of articles exploring other 
aspects of NIPT.14  My collaboration with Karen was not only professionally 
rewarding but also personally enriching.  She provided significant guidance at 
an early and important stage in my career. She is, in short, a model of what legal 
academics should offer to their colleagues and students.  
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